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APPLYING THE WILKO DOCTRINE'S ANTI-ARBITRATION
POLICY IN COMMODITIES FRAUD CASESP
WILLIAM LYNCH SCHALLER*
ROBERT V. SCHALLER**
Courts have long endorsed private arbitration as an alternative to
litigation.' Congress has taken an equally strong stance in support of
arbitration, as evidenced by its passage of the United States Arbitration
Act.2 Despite arbitration's generally favored status, for public policy
reasons the United States Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Wilko v.
Swan3 exempted cases involving Securities Act violations from the fed-
eral arbitration statute's reach. Recognizing the vital public interests
promoted by similar federal protective legislation, courts have broadened
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1. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974)
(arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable). In an effort to allow contract parties
to avoid the costliness and delays of litigation, courts have recognized that arbitration of non-anti-
trust or non-securities claims should be mandated, and the antitrust or securities claims stayed
where the arbitrable claims permeate the case and the antitrust or securities claims are weak, periph-
eral, or secondary. See, e.g., Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116
(7th Cir. 1978).
2. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-208 (1982)). The Arbitration Act recognizes a strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an
alternative dispute resolution process and as the upholding of private contractual obligations. Dei-
trick, The Conflicting Policies Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33 (1984). The
Act's design allows contract parties to avoid the expenses and delays of litigation and places arbitra-
tion agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 510-11, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). For a further discussion of the Arbitration Act, see
notes 86-98 infra and accompanying text.
3. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Wilko doctrine voids agreements to arbitrate future controversies
between contract parties. This doctrine applies when rights established under protective federal
regulation are waived by a contract party by agreeing to arbitrate. For a discussion of the origin of
the Wilko doctrine, see notes 99-103 infra and accompanying text. Somewhat analogous labor law
decisions have held that once Congress provides a judicial remedy to enforce statutory rights, the
judicial remedy may not be denied through the arbitration provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Civil Rights); Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII); Burke v. Latrobe Steel Co., No. 84 3811 (3d
Cir. October 17, 1985) (ERISA).
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the Wilko rule and prohibited arbitration of federal antitrust,4 securities
exchange, 5 bankruptcy, 6 patent,7 and RICO claims8 as against public
policy.
A question has arisen in recent years as to whether and under what
circumstances the Wilko doctrine should be extended to the commodities
field. 9 The majority lo of courts confronted with this issue before 1982
refused to apply Wilko to void commodities futures contract arbitration
clauses on the basis that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act and its statutory precursors were not sufficiently analogous to anti-
trust, securities, and other public-oriented protective legislation. In
1982, Congress amended the commodities statute to sanction arbitration
in most cases, a decision that seemed to reject the anti-arbitration hold-
ing in Wilko. Unfortunately, the scope and effectiveness of the 1982 leg-
islation's arbitration mandate remain in doubt.
This article examines the impact of the commodities statute's 1982
arbitration provisions. As background, a description of affected com-
modities market participants is provided to illustrate the relationships
4. See Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.
1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cit. 1974); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d
1068 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co.,
426 F.2d 980 (9th Cit. 1970); American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., Inc., 53
U.S.L.W. 5069 (1985) (international antitrust disputes are arbitrable).
5. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (dictum);
First Heritage Corp. v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 710 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1983); Merill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). International securities
transactions disputes, however, are arbitrable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). The arbitrability of
actions under the 1934 Act remains unsettled in light of proarbitration language found in Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985) (pendent state securities law claims are
arbitrable).
6. See Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
7. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1970), cerL denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971). Congress recently amended the federal patent laws to
permit arbitration, thereby nullifying the holding in Beckman Instruments. See 35 U.S.C. § 294
(Supp. 1985); Goldstein, Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Patent Validity or Infringement, 72 ILL.
BAR. J. 350 (1984).
8. Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1984). See S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l. Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
9. For a discussion of extending the Wilko doctrine to the commodities field, see notes 115-122
infra and accompanying text.
10. See Smokey Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720
F.2d 1446 (5th Cir. 1983); Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 683 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1982);
Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982); Tamari v. Bache
& Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Corcoran
v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Hagstrom v. Breutman,
572 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. II. 1983); Rumnes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
COMMODITIES FRAUD CASES
governed by typical arbitration agreements. This description is followed
by a review of the historical development of commodities futures market
regulation. The United States Arbitration Act and the origin and prog-
eny of the Wilko doctrine's anti-arbitration exception in non-commodi-
ties cases are then discussed. After examining the Wilko doctrine's
applicability to commodities futures contracts before 1982, this article
next notes certain problems created by the different language found in
the commodities statute's 1982 arbitration amendments. The article then
explores whether the 1982 arbitration enactments preclude Wilko argu-
ments based on antitrust, securities, and RICO claims predicated on un-
derlying commodities transactions. Because the current commodities
arbitration provisions do not appear to preempt antitrust, securities, and
RICO actions, legislative solutions are offered.
THE COMMODITIES FUTURES MARKET
Roles and Strategies of Market Participants
Generally, there are two classes of customers trading in commodi-
ties" futures contracts' 2-hedgers 3 and speculative investors.' 4  While
11. The term "commodity" includes the following: wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye,
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill reeds, butter, eggs, solanum tuberosum (Irish potatotes), wool, wool
tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soy bean oil and all other fats
and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soy beans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock prod-
ucts, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and other goods. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
12. Every aspect of the futures contract is standardized except price. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d
283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980). Standardization also makes the contracts fungible. Id. Commodity futures
contracts are transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or
executed on a contract market, exchange, or board of trade. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Commodity fu-
tures contracts have also been defined as bilateral executory agreements for the purchase and sale of
a particular commodity. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 283. For a discussion of futures contracts,
see Fishman, Commodities Future" An Introduction For Lawyers, 65 CH. BAR RECORD 306 (1984).
13. A hedger is a trader with an interest in the cash market for the commodity, who deals in
futures contracts as a means of transferring risk he faces in the cash market. Leist v. Simplot, 638
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980). The hedger locks in a price at an exchange and thereby protects himself
against potential loss in the cash market caused by unfavorable price fluctuation. Fishman, supra
note 12, at 312. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 131, 133, 182, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843 (hereinafter cited as "1974 House Report"). See also 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.3(z)(1984) (complicated definition of "bona fide hedging transactions and positions" promul-
gated by the CFTC).
14. Speculators are individuals who assume the risk of price fluctuations without a correspond-
ing interest in the cash market. Fishman, supra note 12, at 313. A speculator's role in the markets is
to take the risks that the hedger is unwilling to accept. The profit opportunity makes the speculator
willing to take those risks. The activity of speculators is essential to the operation of a futures
market because the composite bids and offers of large numbers of individuals tends to broaden a
market. The broadened market allows the larger trade hedging orders to be executed with minimum
price fluctuations. By increasing the number of bids and offers available at any given price level, the
speculator usually helps to minimize price fluctuations rather than to intensify them. Without the
trading activity of the speculative fraternity, the liquidity, so badly needed in futures markets, simply
would not exist. Trading volume would be restricted materially since, without a host of speculative
orders in the trading ring, many larger trade orders at limit prices would simply go unfilled due to
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either class of customer can be a buyer1 5 or seller of futures contracts,1 6
only hedgers produce and process the underlying commodity 1 7
Commodities producers hedge against anticipated price declines in
the cash market18 by entering into equivalent 19 short20 futures contracts
for the month in which they expect to sell their physical commodities. In
contrast, commodities processors hedge21 against anticipated price in-
creases by going long22 for the month in which they expect to purchase
the commodities. Hedgers thus use the futures market to lock in future
prices as insurance23 against unfavorable price fluctuations. As a result,
losses caused by cash market declines in the producer's case, or by price
the floor broker's inability to find an equally large but opposing hedge order at the same price to
complete the match. 1974 House Report, supra note 13, at 138.
15. A buyer commits himself to accept delivery of the commodity and pay the agreed price.
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980).
16. A seller of a futures contract commits himself to deliver the commodity at a fixed date in
the future. 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, SEcuRITEs FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.6 (421)
(1979); See 1974 House Report, supra note 13, at 130.
17. See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 41 (1977) (less than 1% of all
futures contracts culminate in actual delivery). 1974 House Report, supra note 13, at 129 (less than
3% delivery); Campbell, Trading in Futures under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 215, 217 (1957) (1% delivery). Neither the speculative investor nor the person using the
futures market as a hedge for his position in the market for the actual commodity generally desires
delivery. See also Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1962); Note, The
Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73
YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1963).
In occasional instances, however, people do use futures trading as an alternative market for the
physical commodity. 1974 House Report, supra note 13, at 132. Delivery is made through the
clearinghouse by transfer of warehouse receipts or rights to loaded freight cars and then transported
according to the purchaser's instructions. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1971).
18. The cash market is the open forum where sellers and purchasers distribute the actual, phys-
ical commodity. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1980). A cash transaction means the
actual purchase or sale of a commodity-as when a farmer sells grain to a grain elevator or the
elevator operator sells to a miller. Fishman, supra note 12, at 308.
19. The producer sells an amount of futures contracts equivalent to the amount of tangible
commodity he expects to produce. For example, a wheat farmer who anticipates harvesting 5,000
bushels of wheat would sell a commodity future contract equivalent to 5,000 bushels of wheat.
20. A customer who has sold a futures contract, someone committed to deliver the commodity
in the future, is said to be in a "short" position. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. The benefits of hedging extend beyond the immediate participants in the transactions be-
cause hedging of price risks in a futures market enables merchants to reduce their exposure in doing
business, and enables merchants to operate on a lower profit margin with consequent lower prices to
the consumer. 1974 House Report, supra note 13, at 132-33. See also S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843 (hereinafter cited as "1974
Senate Report"); see also Valdez, Modernizing the Regulation ofthe Commodity Futures Markets, 13
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 40 (1975).
22. A customer who has bought a futures contract, someone committed to accept delivery of a
commodity in the future, is said to be in a "long" position. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d
Cir. 1980).
23. While hedging performs an insurance function, it is actually quite different from insurance.
Unlike typical insurance, the risks faced by those dealing in the cash market, the market for the
actual commodity, are not spread among those similarly situated. Rather, the risks in the cash
market are shifted to customers in the futures market. Bianco, The Mechanics of Futures Trading:
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increases in the processor's case, are offset by profits earned in futures
transactions. 24
The commodities exchange system would not function, however, if
only hedgers sold and purchased commodities futures contracts. 25 Spec-
ulative investors, with no underlying interest in the cash market, are es-
sential to assume the risks hedgers seek to shift.26 While speculators and
hedgers are distinct in theory, there actually is no clear line of demarca-
tion between them in practice. Hedgers frequently do not merely balance
their cash market risks in the futures market, but engage in some specu-
lation as well-buying or selling futures contracts based on price
expectations.
Domestic and international investor interest in expanding commodi-
ties markets has sparked a host of creative new financial futures con-
tracts.27  Newly created contracts have consisted of precious metals,
petroleum, Eurodollars, Government National Mortgage Association
commitments, and other sophisticated instruments. With the develop-
ment of those new markets and products, the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission ("CFTC") has attempted to ensure investor protection.
The CFTC's efforts, however, sometimes have been thwarted by unscru-
pulous exchanges, brokers, and sales representatives.
Speculation and Manipulation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 32 (1977); Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154, 1158 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1971).
24. Except when delivery is actually taken, a short and a long must liquidate their positions
prior to the closing of trading in the particular futures contract by purchasing opposite contracts to
offset their positions. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980). A short must purchase an
equal number of long contracts; a long must sell an equal number of short contracts; Id. Although
the means by which this is done is routinely referred to as futures trading, futures contracts are not
"traded" in the normal sense of the word. Rather, they are formed and discharged. Clark, Geneal-
ogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Delivery" in the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1176 (1978). If during the contract holding period the price of the
contract future declined, usually because of market events, the short will realize a profit; if the
contract future price has risen, the long will realize a profit. See Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154,
1157 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1971) (discussion of price movement).
25. As a general rule, "for a market to be broad enough to be efficient and to accommodate the
extremely large orders that come in from time to time from dealers and commercial firms, 50 to 75
percent of the open interest and volume of trading must come from speculators-this is essential to
sustain a viable market." Johnston, Understanding the Dynamics of Commodity Trading: A Success
Story, 35 Bus. LAW. 705, 709 (1980).
26. Speculators are essential to the market. They provide transactions which add liquidity and
enable hedgers to enter the market at any time instead of waiting until another hedger wants to take
an opposite position. Fishman, supra note 12, at 313. 1974 House Report, supra note 13, at 138. As
other commentators have noted, Congress has recognized that the speculator is what makes the
commodity futures market work. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 16, at § 4.6 (462).
27. For a discussion of international commodities transactions, see Markham & Bergin, The
Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in International Commodity Transactions, 18
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON., 581 (1985).
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Customer Losses Caused by Fraud
Because this article focuses principally on fraud charges arising out
of commodities transactions, a brief review of common fraud situations
provides helpful background for understanding how such claims arise.
One of the most frequently recurring problems concerns misrepresenta-
tions as to the nature of commodities trading and the risks attending it.
For example, overzealous sales representatives may exaggerate the prof-
its2s or minimize the risks29 associated with commodities trading. In
some instances, investment policies and goals are misrepresented. 30 In
other instances, market mechanics, costs, fees, and the nature of the in-
vestment may be distorted or simply not disclosed. 31 And in more ex-
treme cases, high-pressure "boiler room" sales campaigns are undertaken
through unsolicited mailings and telephone calls to induce hasty and un-
suitable commodities investments. 32
Another recurring problem is churning. Churning refers to exces-
sive trading by brokers to generate commissions and fees for themselves
rather than profits for their customers. 33 Whether churning has occurred
depends on a variety of factors, including market conditions, commission
size, and customer sophistication.3 4 Churning can be difficult to prove
and affects sophisticated and unsophisticated investors alike.35
Fraud claims extend to a variety of areas beyond misrepresentations
and churning. Some of the more noteworthy examples are price manipu-
lation,36 unallocated trades, 37 and unauthorized transactions. 38 This
28. See, e.g., Mortell v. Insurance Company of North America, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 458
N.E.2d 922 (1st Dist. 1984).
29. See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Commodities Fluctuations Systems,
Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Inl. 1982).
31. See, e.g., Myron v. Hauser, 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982).
32. See, eg., Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n. v. U.S. Metals Depository Co., 468 F.
Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977); Commodities
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
33. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 1361, 1367 (7th Cit. 1983); Hagstrom v.
Breutman, 572 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Il. 1983).
34. Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Russo v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hamill & Co.,
341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
35. See, eg., McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 736 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir.
1984); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Poser, Options Account Fraud:
Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 Bus. LAW. 571 (1984); Note, Churning by Securities Deal-
ers, 80 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1967).
36. See, eg., Sundheimer v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1982) cert denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983).
37. See, eg., Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Kelly, 585 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
38. See, e.g., Lincoln Commodity Services, v. Meade, 558 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1977); Haltmier v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977); Herman v. T. & S. Commodi-
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sketch of fraud problems is intended to be merely illustrative rather than
exhaustive.
When a customer's investment results in a loss due to fraud, the
customer is understandably and justifiably distraught. The customer's
recourse, however, may be quite limited if a commodities agreement con-
taining an arbitration clause was signed39 when the customer opened the
account. To appreciate fully the significance and propriety of this limita-
tion on a customer's recourse, 4° it is important to consider the role Con-
gress assigned arbitration in the overall commodities market regulatory
scheme.
Regulatory Background
Regulation of commodities futures markets41 is a relatively recent
development. Prior to the Grain Futures Act of 1922,42 commodities
buyers and sellers were free to trade as they wished,43 subject primarily"
to market conditions.45 Pressures of deflated commodities prices,46 fu-
ties, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Fustok v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 577 F. Supp.
852 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
39. The Code of Federal Regulations requires a customer's consent to arbitration be voluntary;
17 C.F.R. § 180, 3(b)(4) (1984). Normally, a customer separately signs both the commodity agree-
ment and the included arbitration clause of that agreement.
40. Each exchange is required to establish an arbitration procedure for customers who have
claims or grievances against any member of the contract market; 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(1 1) (1982). This
procedure is a distinct and separate customer grievance procedure from the reparations proceedings
administered by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Fishman, supra note 12, at 323.
41. Futures markets serve two primary purposes: they provide a barometer for commodity
prices in the economy; and their existence allows the risk of price changes to be shifted. Fishman,
supra note 12, at 310. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). See Anderson, The Regulations of Futures
Contract Innovations in the United States, 4 J. FUTUREs MARKETS 297 (1984) (history of futures
regulation in America).
42. In 1922, Congress passed the Grain Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1982)). The purpose of the Grain Futures Act was to
prevent and remove obstructions and burdens upon interstate commerce in grain, by regulating
transactions on grain future exchanges. The constitutionality of the Grain Futures Act under the
commerce clause power was sustained in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31-40 (1923).
43. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). (The Lochner decision promoted free
commerce by advocating active judicial intervention to invalidate economic regulation). For a com-
prehensive summary of the judicial decisions of the pre-Depression era, see B. WRIGHT, THE
GRowTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942) (Laissez-faire reigned).
44. The Grain Futures Act was actually the second congressional attempt to enact a compre-
hensive regulatory statute with respect to trading in agricultural commodities. The first comprehen-
sive statute was the Futures Trading Act of 1921. Pub. L. No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187 (1921). The
principal provisions of the original Act were immediately declared invalid in Hill v. Wallace, 259
U.S. 44, 63-69 (1922), on the ground that the Act was a congressional attempt to regulate by means
of the taxing power. Shortly after the decision in Hill, Congress enacted the Grain Futures Act,
which was substantially similar to the Future Trading Act, but based on the commerce clause of the
Constitution. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31-40 (1923) (constitutionality
sustained).
45. The supply of commodity goods and demand of processors' dictated the market conditions
until the early part of the twentieth century. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
eled by economic stagnation,47 threatened the viability of unorganized
commodities markets.48  In an attempt to bolster prices, commodities
futures contracts49 were recognized. 50 As the practice of trading in fu-
tures contracts51 developed, boards of trade were organized.5 2
THE NEW DEAL, 27-84 (1959) (President Roosevelt created new restraints on supply and demand in
the agriculture industry during his famous first 100 days in office); A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, 47-59 (1789) (regulation is unnecessary, impractical, and dangerous); for a discussion of
laissez-faire and the savings and loan industry, see Note, FSLIC Federal Receivership Appointments
For Allegedly Insolvent State Savings and Loan Associations: A Plot to Federalize State Savings and
Loans Against Their Will? Telegraph Savings and Loan Association v. Schilling, 33 DEPAUL L.
REV. 783 (1984) (when regulation becomes necessary, active judicial review is necessary to check
overzealous regulators).
46. Prior to futures contracts, agricultural products were sold at central markets. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 756 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1982). At these central mar-
kets, price was adversely affected by temporary local commodity gluts or scarcities. Irwin, Legal
Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 158 (1937). There was a strong tendency to have
a disastrous post-harvest price depression as supply gluts vastly exceeded demand. Id. at 159. In
1937 for example, well over 50% of the U.S. wheat surplus was marketed by farmers in the first four
months of the crop year, July to October. Id. at 158. Prior to the technological advancements in
wheat storage existing in 1937, even greater percentages of crops went immediately to market after
harvest.
47. For a discussion of the financial panic and deep depression of 1893, see P. SMITH, THE RISE
OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, Volume 6, pp. 482-507 (1984). For a discussion of the unprecedented
depression of the 1930's, see Note, FSLIC Federal Receivership Appointments for Allegedly Insolvent
State Savings and Loan Associations: A Plot To Federalize State Savings and Loans Against Their
Will? Telegraph Savings and Loan Association v. Schilling, 33 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 783, 785-787
(1984).
48. See generally, A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 27-84 (1959) (or-
ganizing commodities markets).
49. Trading in wheat futures contributes to the marketing of wheat in the following ways: (1) it
aids in price determination; (2) it assists in the handling of the heavy after-harvest movement; (3) it
makes hedging possible; (4) it provides quotations suitable for wide dissemination; (5) it permits
arbitrage; (6) it promotes the maintenance of price structure in tributary areas; (7) it provides for a
continuous market; and (8) it results in some chance of ownership on futures contracts. Irwin, supra
note 46, at 157.
50. Futures trading evolved from the system of "time contracts" developed during the late 19th
century. Campbell, supra note 17, at 215. The Chicago Board of Trade was the first exchange in the
United States to recognize trading in grain futures as a distinct commercial practice. I. TAYLOR,
HISTORY OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CrrY OF CHICAGO, 146, 192, 317 (1917). Despite its
humble birth, the Chicago Board of Trade is the United States' largest futures exchange, averaging
300,000 contracts valued at nearly $30 billion changing hands daily. Frank, Bobby Goldberg is out to
Jazz up an "Old Gray Lady," Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 1985, at 100.
51. At one time, the time honored attitude had been that futures contracts are gambling con-
tracts if, at the making of the agreements, the parties did not intend to make and receive delivery on
the contracts. Irwin, supra note 46, at 155; for a detailed treatment of this doctrine see Taylor,
Trading in Commodity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63 (1933). Speculation
in commodity futures has, at times, been invectively attacked, see Campbell, supra note 17, at 219,
n. 17. It is currently a well settled issue that a speculator's role as gambler is needed in futures
markets to provide liquidity. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
52. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982). At or-
ganized exchanges, standardized agreements covering specific quantities of graded agricultural com-
modities to be delivered during specified months in the future were bought and sold pursuant to rules
developed by the traders themselves. Id. The exchanges developed standard terms describing the
quantity and quality of the commodity, the time and place of delivery, and the method of payment;
the only variable was price. Id. See IRWIN, EVOLUTION OF FUTURES TRADING, 83-85 (1954) (es-
tablishing the early futures trading regulations). Under different conditions from grain, but with a
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Congressional concern eventually arose over the boards of trade's
inability to curtail their members from manipulating53 prices and dissem-
inating misleading market information.5 4 Demands for federal regula-
tion became insistent, sparked by speculative excesses on the grain
exchanges during the post-World War I period of falling prices and farm
depression. 55 In response, Congress enacted extensive legislation regulat-
ing commodities futures exchanges. 56 The first comprehensive legisla-
tion, the Grain Futures Act of 1922,57 established the basic pattern of all
regulation to follow, concentrating trading on central exchanges subject
to the supervision and control of the federal government. 58
The Grain Futures Act was substantially strengthened by amenda-
tory legislation in 1936 and renamed the Commodity Exchange Act
("CEA").59 The CEA's fundamental purpose was "to insure fair prac-
tice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to provide a
measure of control over those forms of speculative activity which too
often demoralize the markets to the injury of producers and consumers
and the exchanges themselves." 6 The CEA implemented major revi-
sions, such as extending the regulatory ambit of the Grain Futures Act
beyond grain to include a broader range of commodities. 61
similar pattern of development, unorganized trading in time contracts in cotton developed in the
1870s into organized futures trading on cotton exchanges in New York, New Orleans, and Liver-
pool. Id.
53. See Edwards & Edwards, A Legal and Economic Analysis of Manipulation in Futures Mar-
kets, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 333 (1984) (discussion of the effects of manipulation on the economy).
One of the primary purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act was to prevent price manipulation.
Campbell, supra note 17, at 233.
54. Traders on a commodity futures exchange require assurance that there are no market par-
ticipants who have preferential access to information. United States of America v. Dial, No. 83-
3172, 84-1339 (7th Cir. March 19, 1985).
55. H.R. REP. No. 565, Part II, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4022 (hereinafter cited as "1982 House Report").
56. Although Congress was concerned about customer protection against manipulation, the
passage of the Grain Futures Act of 1922 did not eliminate the problem. Considerable discussion in
recent years has focused on the need for more investor protection in futures markets. For an eco-
nomic and legal analysis of the need for additional governmental regulation, see Fischel & Gross-
man, Customer Protection in the Futures and Securities Markets, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 273
(1984).
57. Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
58. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1980).
59. Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, § 1, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). The constitutionality of the Com-
modity Exchange Act was sustained in Nelson v. Secretary of Agriculture, 133 F.2d 453, 455 (7th
Cir. 1943); Board of Trade v. Milligan, 90 F.2d 855, 857-860 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
710 (1937); Moore v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 90 F.2d 735, 736-741 (7th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 710 (1937). All trading in futures contracts is within the reach of the commerce
power. Corn Products Refining Company v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
60. H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935).
61. The Commodity Exchange Act extended governmental regulation beyond grain to include
cotton, rice, mill feeds, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes. See 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1984).
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The basic form and scope of governmental regulation of commodity
futures markets remained substantially unchanged until 1974 when Con-
gress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
("CFTCA").62 The CFTCA amounted to a complete overhaul of the
CEA. 63 The CFTCA amendments broadened the statute's regulatory
coverage from the agricultural commodities with which it had been his-
torically concerned to include "all other goods and articles.., and all
services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in." Consistent with this expanded cov-
erage, the CFTCA transferred enforcement of its provisions from the De-
partment of Agriculture to a newly created Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC).65
The CFTC was designed to be an independent federal regulatory
commission patterned after and similar to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.66 The CFTC was organized to focus upon specific
problems relating to commodity markets. 67 The CFTC's exclusive au-
thority68 to regulate and monitor the futures markets was intended to
provide it with extensive regulatory and enforcement responsibility. 69
Pursuant to these responsibilities, the CFTC's power has come to span
all aspects of futures trading, including the regulation of exchanges70 and
market participants. 71
62. Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1982)). For a discussion of the current practice of governmental regulation of fu-
tures markets through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, see Anderson, The Regulation
of Futures Contract Innovations in the United States, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 297 (1984).
63. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1980).
64. 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
65. For a highly informative explanation of the Commodity Futures Trading commission's ju-
risdiction, operating areas and authority, see Fishman, supra note 12, at 314-318.
66. Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving Regulatory Indepen-
dence, 33 Bus. LAW. 163, 201 (1977).
67. Fishman, supra note 12, at 314.
68. Since the CEA of 1974, state law has been preempted by federal regulations. Consequently,
states may act in the commodities field only pursuant to explicit authorization. Fishman, supra note
12, at 316. For example, section 6(d) of the CEA specifically allows the states to bring enforcement
proceedings for perceived CEA violations. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)2 (1982).
69. Fishman, supra note 12, at 316.
70. The CFTC affects the exchanges' operations in three ways. First, it has the power to desig-
nate contract markets. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). Second, the CFTC also has the power to approve or
alter exchange rules. 7 U.S.C. § 12(a)(7) (1984). Last, its broad emergency powers empower it to
take whatever action "is necessary to maintain and restore orderly trading." 7 U.S.C. § 12(aX9)
(1984).
71. The CFTC exercises its authority to regulate market participants by requiring them to reg-
ister with the CFTC. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.7-1.11 (1984). In addition to registration,
participants must file reports relating to their activities in the markets. See, eg., Fishman, supra note
12, at 318 (a discussion of reports required to be filed). Finally, the CFTC has the power to establish
fitness standards for market participants required to be registered. See, eg., 7 U.S.C. § 6 (p) (1982)
(this authority includes the power to require specific individuals to complete educational courses
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One of the primary objectives and mandates of the CEA and
CFTCA was customer protection.72 Unlike the CEA, however, the
CFTCA was not silent on the subjects of customer grievances and claims.
The CFTCA added two remedial provisions for the protection of individ-
ual customers. Section 106 of the CFTCA authorized the CFTC to grant
"reparations" 73 to any customer complaining of a CEA violation, or a
CEA implementing regulation violation, committed by any futures com-
mission merchant, floor broker, commodity trading advisor,74 or com-
modity pool 75 operator. 76 In addition, section 209 of the CFTCA
required every contract market to provide an arbitration procedure for
the settlement of customers' claims less than $15,000. 77
The initial arbitration provision was of questionable value because of
the statutory restrictions on its use.78 In 1982 the United States Comp-
troller General recommended that steps be taken to make arbitration a
more available and effective method of customer recourse. 79 In response,
a congressional committee proposed an amendment to section 209 to en-
hance the attractiveness of arbitration. The House Agriculture Commit-
tee suggested eliminating the $15,000 ceiling on arbitration claims in the
expectation that customers with claims exceeding $15,000 would be en-
couraged to arbitrate their claims instead of petitioning the CFTC for
relating to their activities, hence insuring the competency of those who operate in the futures
markets).
72. For a discussion of duties imposed on market participants to insure customer protection,
see Fishman, supra note 12, at 318-322. See also 1982 House Report, supra note 55 (customer protec-
tion via the CFTC).
73. A reparations proceeding administered by the CFTC is a distinct and separate customer
grievance procedure from the arbitration procedure. Fishman, supra note 14, at 316 (they both serve
as alternative vehicles to insure customer protection on contract markets operated pursuant to the
CEA and the rules promulgated thereunder).
74. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 318. (Commodity Trading Advisors advise others on the
value of commodities).
75. Id. (commodity pool operators operate funds or pools of money for trading in the commod-
ity markets).
76. 88 Stat. 1389, 1393-1395 (1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (adding § 14
of the CEA)). This section authorized the CFTC to investigate complaints and to afford a hearing
before an administrative law judge-file facts warrant such action. Reparations orders entered by
the CFTC are subject to judicial review. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353 (1982).
77. 88 Stat. 1389, 1401 (1974). Section 209 added the following language to the CEA:
[E]ach contract market shall provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or
otherwise for the settlement of customers' claims and grievances against any member or
employee thereof: Provided that (i) the use of such procedure by a customer shall be
voluntary, (ii) the procedure shall not be applicable to any claim in excess of $15,000,
(iii) the procedure shall not result in any compulsory payment except as agreed upon be-
tween the parties, and (iv) the term "customer" as used in this subsection shall not include
a futures commission merchant or a floor broker.
78. 1982 House Report, supra note 55.
79. Id. at 3904.
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reparations hearings.80 The committee believed that arbitration would
be an equally viable forum for resolving customer claims in excess of
$15,000 and perceived no logical reason why reparations should be the
only out-of-court forum for resolution of such disputes.81
Congress adopted the House Agriculture Committee's amendment
as part of the Futures Trading Act of 1982.82 Congress created an action
for actual damages as the exclusive private remedy for most violations of
the commodities statute and explicitly approved arbitration to resolve
such claims. 83 Congress also removed the $15,000 limit on arbitrable
contract market claims84 and inserted the following broad language in
favor of arbitration: "Nothing in this subsection shall limit or abridge
the rights of the parties to agree in advance of a dispute upon any forum
for resolving claims under this section, including arbitration."8 5
As this brief history suggests, Congress has displayed considerable
interest in regulating the volatile commodities market. To bolster public
confidence in the commodities industry, Congress created a complicated
regulatory framework to curb market abuses and to provide appropriate
remedies, including arbitration. Unfortunately, the precise role Congress
intended arbitration to play in this regulatory scheme is unclear. The
commodities statute's ambiguous language and minimal legislative his-
tory offer little guidance in determining the extent to which courts are to
compel arbitration in lieu of court proceedings in commodities cases gov-
erned by the 1982 legislation. It is therefore useful to examine the Wilko
doctrine's securities law origin and extension to other fields before con-
sidering the Wilko decision's application in the commodities field.
80. Id. at 3905.
81. Id. The committee's proposed amendment to section 209 would also delete the CEA lan-
guage requiring that the arbitration procedures not result in any compulsory payment except as
agreed upon by the parties. This change is intended to make clear that awards rendered on counter-
claims in arbitration are binding without the necessity of an agreement. The amendment does not
affect the existing requirement that the use of arbitration by the customer is voluntary or the CFTC's
understanding that exchange members must participate in arbitration proceedings which the cus-
tomer has elected to pursue. Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2298 (1982).
83. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a).
84. 1982 House Report, supra note 55. Also, the provision requiring an agreement for compul-
sory payments is removed. This revision is intended to ensure that arbitration awards on counter-
claims are binding on both parties. Finally, the definition of the term "customer" is broadened to
include any person for or on behalf of whom a member of a contract market effects a transaction on
such contract market, except another member of that contract market. Thus, the definition now
includes futures commission merchants or floor brokers who have a claim based on a customer
relationship with such contract market member, provided they are not member of the same contract
market. Id.
85. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(2) (1982).
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THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE WILKO EXCEPTION
The United States Arbitration Act 86 has long embodies a strong fed-
eral policy encouraging arbitration.8 7 The Arbitration Act was designed
both to allow contracting parties to avoid the expense and delay of litiga-
tion 88 and to place arbitration provisions upon the same footing as other
contract clauses.8 9
Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides that written arbitration
contracts must be enforced by the courts.90 Courts strive to uphold arbi-
tration clauses because to do otherwise would allow one party to ignore
the contract and to seek recourse via the courts.91 To allow judicial re-
86. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982).
87. Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, (1984); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v.
National Rail Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1977); Corcoran v. Shearson/American Ex-
press Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbi-
tration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265 (1926) (reversed the doctrine that agreements for arbitration are
revocable at will and are unenforceable).
88. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (arbitration is an alternative to the complica-
tions of litigation). Arbitration supporters believe arbitration is faster, less costly, more informal,
more private, and more confidential than litigation. Moreover, arbitrators frequently have an exper-
tise in the field of the dispute. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (1985).
The advantages of arbitration are as follows: alleviating civil court congestion; permitting adjudica-
tion of claims not otherwise heard; confidentiality in commercial disputes; selecting an expert as
arbitrator; and business convenience. Rayner, Arbitration: Private Dispute Resolution, 22 U.W.
ONT. L. REv. 33, 36-44 (1984). Arbitration cases are generally processed more quickly than court
cases and arbitration cases are more likely to be decided, rather than settled. However, arbitration
processing is not necessarily less costly than court processing. Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration
Alternative, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 6 (1983). On the other hand, litigation supporters contend that the
federal district courts are not overburdened and that most cases are settled anyway. Cookey, Punc-
turing Three Myths About Litigation, 70 A.B.A.J. 75 (1984) (approximately 88 percent of all civil
cases filed in American courts are settled). The disadvantages of arbitration are as follows: no jury
trial; lack of formal procedure; common law is incapable of developing new principles; and no public
hearings. Rayner, Arbitration: Private Dispute Resolution, 22 U.W. OTrr. L. REV. 33, 36-44 (1984).
89. Deitrick, The Conflicting Policies Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33,
33 (1984). Judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements existed for centuries. Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). English courts traditionally con-
sidered irrevocable arbitration agreements as ousting the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to en-
force such agreements. This view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to
the time of the adoption in 1924 of the Arbitration Act. See Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing
Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
580 (1952).
90. Section 2 provides as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
91. See The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (the arbitration contract
fixing an arbitration forum for resolution of all disputes "was made in an arm's length negotiation by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and counterveiling reasons
it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts.").
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course would frustrate one of the contract's essential features and would
lead to prolonged litigation, a risk contracting parties seek to eliminate
by means of the arbitration clause.92
If a contracting party attempts to avoid the contract by filing suit in
a United States District Court, the adverse party may petition that court
to stay the action, pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration Act, until
arbitration has been completed in accordance with the agreement. 93 In-
deed, the moving party may petition the court not only to enforce the
arbitration agreement but also to compel the filing party to submit its
claim to arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the Arbitration Act.94
A judicially-created exception to the Arbitration Act's enforcement
provisions, however, has been established for certain cases involving pro-
tective federal legislation." This exception was created, among other
92. Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
93. Section 3 provides as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (court
stayed proceedings since a contract evidencing a transaction in commerce existed).
94. Section 4 provides as follows:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty
of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agree-
ment. Five day's notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the party in
default. Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement. The hearings and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be
within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed. If
the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the
same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be
demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admi-
ralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is
raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the
return duty of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such
demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that
purpose. If the jury finds that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that
there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily di-
recting the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
95. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (securities); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978) (antitrust); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437
(2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied 432 U.S. 910 (1977) (bankruptcy); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Techni-
cal Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970) cerL denied 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (patent); Breyer
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reasons, to enhance the integrity of certain marketplaces by protecting
the investing public.96 The protective federal legislation exception comes
into play when a conflict arises between fundamental policies of "federal
statutory protection of a large segment of the public, frequently in an
inferior bargaining position, and encouragement of arbitration as a
'prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies.' ,,97 Im-
plicit in this judicial exception is the rationale that an arbitral forum is
not adequate to effectuate the policies underlying protective legislation. 98
The landmark Supreme Court decision creating the exception to ar-
bitration enforcement was Wilko v. Swan.99 In Wilko, a customer
purchased stock from a securities brokerage firm. Subsequently, the
value of the stock decreased substantially, causing the customer to sell
the stock for a loss. The stock purchaser filed suit in the United States
District Court, claiming that the loss was due to the brokerage firm's
misrepresentations and omissions of information in violation of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.
Pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration Act, the brokerage firm
moved to stay the trial court proceedings pending arbitration. The bro-
kerage firm maintained that every controversy was controlled by the
terms of the contract agreement between the purchaser and the firm,
which established arbitration as the method of resolving all future con-
troversies. The district court agreed with the customer and refused to
stay the action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the trial court and stayed the action. The cus-
tomer thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
The Court framed the issue in Wilko as whether agreements to arbitrate
future controversies were binding on stock purchasers, thereby waiving
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933.
Before the Supreme Court, the stock purchaser argued that arbitra-
tion clauses were void because Congress intended, in enacting section
14100 of the Securities Act, to prevent sellers from maneuvering buyers
into a position that would weaken their ability to recover under the Se-
v. First National Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955 (D. N.J. 1982) (commodities). The courts have
frequently refused to order arbitration when arbitration of disputes conflicts with other important
federal policies. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French, 425 F. Supp. 1231 (D. D.C. 1977).
96. Milani v. ContiCommodity Service, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (the protection of investors by federal courts controls over
the policy favoring arbitration).
97. American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)
(quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)).
98. Breyer v. First National Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D. N.J. 1982).
99. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
100. 48 Stat. 84, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1984). Section 14 provides: "Any condition,
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
curities Act. The purchaser specifically contended that compulsory arbi-
tration weakened his ability to enforce his rights under the Securities Act
because arbitration lacked the certainty of a lawsuit. The purchaser also
contended that the arbitration clause was void under section 14 because
it waived compliance with the Securities Act provision that granted
courts jurisdiction over suits. 101
The brokerage firm responded by asserting that arbitration was
merely a trial substitute that provided the same rights as court proceed-
ings. The firm therefore claimed the Securities and Arbitration Acts did
not conflict in either their language or congressional purposes. Finally,
the brokerage firm maintained that each statute functioned within its
own scope, the former to protect investors and the latter to simplify re-
covery for actionable violations by issuers or dealers in securities.
The Supreme Court rejected the brokerage firm's arguments. The
Court reasoned that the arbitration clause preempted the purchaser's
right to trial and thus created a conflict between the mutually exclusive
remedies afforded by the Securities and Arbitration Acts. The Wilko
Court held the arbitration clause void because it effectively waived com-
pliance with a provision of the Securities Act10 2 in violation of section 14
of that statute.
In support of its holding that the right to select the judicial forum
cannot be waived under section 14, the Court noted that Congress de-
sired rigid compliance with the Securities Act to protect disadvantaged
buyers, many of whom stand in a bargaining position inferior to that of
brokerage houses. 10 3 The Court also suggested that protecting the in-
vesting public strengthened the integrity of the marketplace. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the
trial court that had refused to stay the purchaser's action at law pending
arbitration.
The Wilko Rationale Extended to Other Fields
Since Wilko, courts have struggled to define the scope of the anti-
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the commission shall be void."
101. 48 Stat. 86, as amended 49 Stat. 1921, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). Section 22(a) pro-
vides: "The district courts of the United States.. .shall have jurisdiction... concurrent with State
and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this subchapter."
102. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act was waived. See note 111.
103. Traditionally, issuers of and dealers in securities have better opportunities to investigate and
appraise the prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities than buyers. Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
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arbitration doctrine's impact. Wilko and its progeny have applied the
doctrine's rationale to create court-imposed exceptions voiding arbitra-
tion agreements in various fields of law beyond securities law. A review
of leading decisions illustrates that the doctrine has been extended to an-
titrust, patent, bankruptcy, and RICO actions.
In American Safety Equipment v. Maguire,10 4 a licensee claimed its
license agreement violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. 0 5 The agreement
granted American Safety an exclusive license to use the licensor's trade-
mark, but also allowed sublicensing to anyone not competing with the
licensor. In addition, the license agreement required American Safety to
refrain from selling and marketing various products that competed with
those of the licensor. The license agreement contained an arbitration
clause.
After their business relationship soured, American Safety filed suit
against its licensor in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment
that the license agreement was illegal and void from its inception. The
complaint alleged that several clauses of the agreement violated the Sher-
man Act because they unlawfully extended the licensor's trademark mo-
nopoly and unreasonably restricted American Safety's business. In
response, the licensor demanded that American Safety arbitrate all issues
relating to the license agreement, and moved to stay American Safety's
declaratory judgment action pending arbitration. The trial judge held
that the arbitration clause in the agreement was broad enough to encom-
pass both the antitrust violation claims and the validity of the license
agreement, finding no public policy against referring them to arbitration.
Accordingly, the judge stayed American Safety's declaratory judgment
action pending arbitration, and American Safety appealed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals defined the issue broadly as
whether the statutory right American Safety sought to enforce was "of a
character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration." 106 The Second
Circuit held that Congress intended antitrust claims to be resolved in the
courts, rejecting arbitration for two reasons. First, the court noted the
public nature of antitrust law enforcement, observing that antitrust viola-
tions can affect thousands of people and inflict staggering economic dam-
age.10 7 Because the Sherman Act was designed to remedy such violations
by promoting the national interest in a competitive economy, the court
concluded that a plaintiff asserting his rights under the antitrust statute is
104. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
106. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953).
107. American Safety Equipment v. J.P. Maguire, 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968).
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analogous to a private attorney-general protecting the public's interest.
Second, the court in American Safety emphasized that judicial proceed-
ings are better suited than arbitration procedures for resolving antitrust
issues because antitrust cases tend to be complicated and involve exten-
sive and diverse evidence. Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated the
trial court's stay pending arbitration and required the trial court to de-
cide the issues of antitrust law.'0 8
American Safety represents an important extension of the Wilko
doctrine. The Wilko Court denied arbitration because the Securities Act
specifically conferred jurisdiction on the courts. In American Safety, the
court acknowledged that the Sherman Act did not specifically grant ju-
risdiction to the courts. Nevertheless, the American Safety court denied
arbitration because the public policy behind federal antitrust legisla-
tion-protecting the broad public interest in competition-demanded
court intervention to assure proper enforcement. Thus, the court in
American Safety held that the Sherman Act modifies and supercedes the
Arbitration Act where arbitration would frustrate the intent of Congress.
The court in Beckman Instruments v. Technical Development'°9
agreed with the rationale espoused in American Safety and extended it to
the patent law field. Beckman involved a licensee who refused to pay
royalties for the use of an amplifier covered by Technical's patent. The
refusal precipitated a demand by Technical for arbitration under the
terms of the license agreement. In response, Beckman filed suit in the
district court challenging the validity of the patent and the legality of the
sub-licensing agreement. The district court refused to stay the court pro-
ceedings pending arbitration.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that patent
claims are not arbitrable. The Beckman court noted that challenges to
allegedly invalid patents110 are encouraged because federal policy favors
free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection."' The
court denied arbitration because the balance of equities demonstrated
that the licensor's interests did not weigh heavily when measured against
the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in
the use of ideas belonging in the public domain. In effect, the court in
Beckman held that, unlike arbitration, judicial proceedings protect the
108. The American Safety court did not rule out arbitration of all aspects of the dispute. The
court held that arbitration was inappropriate to decide whether the license agreement was valid
insofar as that empowered the arbitrator to decide issues of antitrust law. Id.
109. 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1970).
110. Id. at 59.
111. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969).
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public interest in promoting free competition by allowing patent chal-
lengers to act as private attorney-generals.
The Wilko arbitration prohibition has also been applied to bank-
ruptcy claims. In re Cross Electric Co., Inc. 11 2 involved a lawsuit by a
chapter 11 debtor under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to recover
on a pre-petition contract containing an arbitration clause. The defend-
ant creditor, who had asserted no claim against the estate, moved to dis-
miss the debtor's lawsuit, alleging that the Virginia bankruptcy court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction in light of the arbitration clause.
The bankruptcy court recognized that the question presented was
one of first impression under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. In dismissing
the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, the bankruptcy court held
that in drafting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress intended
to insure the expeditious and orderly processing of all cases involving
law, equity, and admiralty coming within the bankruptcy courts' juris-
diction. 1 3 The court found that its jurisdiction included all civil pro-
ceedings arising under Title 11, including exclusive jurisdiction of all
property of the debtor wherever located. Further, the bankruptcy court
found that matters affecting contractual provisions as to arbitration
should be left to the discretion of the court to abstain or not to abstain
under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d).114 The court elected not to compel arbitra-
tion, noting that the issues raised in the complaint could be expeditiously
heard and determined by the courts. The court also noted that relegating
bankruptcy matters to protracted arbitration proceedings where discov-
ery rules may not be available could prolong indefinitely a decision in
bankruptcy matters.
APPLYING WILKO IN COMMODITIES CASES
Anti-arbitration Arguments Before The 1982 Legislation
Unlike most protective federal legislation scrutinized under the
Wilko doctrine, the present commodities statute includes arbitration pro-
visions, as did its precursors since 1974. Surprisingly, this distinction
was afforded little weight in the commodities cases decided before the
effective date of the 1982 legislation. The early commodities decisions
are nonetheless valuable for the insights they offer concerning courts' re-
ceptiveness to Wilko arguments in future cases.
As previously noted, the commodities statute originally contained
112. 9 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981).
113. Deitrick, supra note 2, at 36.
114. Id.
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no arbitration clause. In adopting an arbitration provision in 1974, Con-
gress apparently paid little attention to arbitration's impact on or consis-
tency with the overall regulatory scheme then in place. Indeed, the 62-
page legislative history devoted a scant two paragraphs to the unprece-
dented arbitration section. As passed, section 209 simply required con-
tract markets to provide fair and equitable arbitration procedures for
claims under $15,000 voluntarily submitted by customers.
Despite the 1974 legislation's express authorization of arbitration
under certain circumstances, some early decisions rejected arbitration as
a means of resolving commodities-trading disputes. For example, in Mi-
lani v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., "15 a customer sued his account ex-
ecutive and commodities brokerage firm for alleged violations of the
commodities statute. The account executive and brokerage firm moved
to compel arbitration pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act, re-
lying upon a provision in the customer's commodities contract that man-
dated arbitration of any controversies arising out of or relating to the
contract. The court noted that arbitration was arguably an appropriate
forum in light of the limited authorization of arbitration in section 209 of
the commodities statute and the general authorization of arbitration in
the federal arbitration statute. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to
order arbitration, citing Wilko and its progeny as authority for the prop-
osition that protection of investors and preservation of the marketplace's
integrity can be accomplished effectively only through judicial
proceedings.
A similar ruling was made in Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French. "16
In French, the customer executed a contract to trade commodity futures.
After sustaining heavy losses, the customer filed a reparations action
with the CFTC pursuant to section 14 of the commodities statute and
regulations thereunder. The brokerage firm refused to recognize the rep-
arations request, and informed the customer that the brokerage firm in-
tended to seek arbitration, as mandated in the customer's contract with
the brokerage firm. When the customer refused to arbitrate, the broker-
age firm initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court to compel
arbitration.
After reviewing the tension between the federal arbitration statute
and the need for judicial enforcement of protective federal legislation first
recognized in Wilko, the trial court ruled that the anti-arbitration excep-
tion should be extended to commodities disputes. The court considered
115. 462 F. Supp. 405, 407 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
116. 425 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1977).
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the CFTC a public forum comparable to a court, and therefore granted
the customer's request to dismiss the brokerage firm's demand for arbi-
tration. In recognizing the CFTC as an appropriate public forum in
which to resolve the commodities dispute, the court in French specifically
acknowledged the ruling in Milani that courts are an equal, though not
exclusive, forum for adjudicating commodity claims.
Still another case recognizing the reach of Wilko in the commodities
context was Breyer v. First National Monetary Corp."1 7 In Breyer, the
customers signed a commodities trading agreement that contained an ar-
bitration clause. After the customers' account sustained heavy losses, the
brokerage firm liquidated the customers' holdings to satisfy the deficit
created by the customers' losses. The brokerage firm attempted to do so
by instituting arbitration against the customers. The customers re-
sponded by initiating an action in the United States District Court seek-
ing damages for violations of the commodities statute and an order
preliminarily enjoining any arbitration proceedings pending the litiga-
tion's outcome.
The trial court acknowledged the general federal policy favoring ar-
bitration and its subsequent qualification by the anti-arbitration excep-
tion established in Wilko. The court in Breyer then noted the specific,
limited arbitration mandate found in section 209 of the commodities stat-
ute. The court viewed the arbitration requirement in section 209 as im-
plying Congress' reluctance to authorize arbitration as a general remedy
for violations of the commodities statute. Accordingly, the court in
Breyer agreed with the customers, invoked Wilko, and enjoined the bro-
kerage firm from seeking arbitration.
Although the foregoing decisions favored extension of the Wilko
doctrine to the commodities law field, subsequent opinions by the courts
of appeals rejected the anti-arbitration exception for commodities claims.
The Seventh Circuit in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S. A. L.1 8
became the first court of appeals to do so. Over a vigorous dissent by
Circuit Judge Luther Swygert, the majority in Tamari distinguished the
application of the securities statute in Wilko from the application of the
commodities statute in Tamari on the basis that the securities legislation
contained an anti-waiver provision not found in the commodities legisla-
tion. In the alternative, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the savings clause
117. 548 F. Supp. 955, 961 (D.N.J. 1982).
118. 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1977). Accord, Hagstrom v. Breutman,
572 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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in the commodities statute exempted pre-1975 claims such as the one
before it from the recent amendments to the commodities enactment.
A number of cases after Tamari also rejected Wilko as applied to
commodities claims. In Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 1 19 the
First Circuit concluded that neither Wilko nor its progeny implied that
the commodities statute should be read to forbid pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. After noting the commodities statute's omission of an anti-
waiver section similar to the one relied upon by the Supreme Court in
Wilko, the First Circuit pointed out that the commodities statute had an
arbitration provision and that the CFTC had promulagated regulations
specifically allowing the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The court
of appeals in Ingbar deferred to the CFTC's administrative expertise, ap-
proved the arbitration agreement, and ordered the trial court to permit
arbitration to proceed.
Following the First Circuit's lead, the Fifth Circuit in Smoky Green-
haw Cotton v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. 120 also refused
to extend Wilko to commodities cases. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
the similarity between the securities and commodities markets, but sug-
gested that Congress desired to regulate these markets in different man-
ners. In particular, the court of appeals in Smoky Greenhaw Cotton read
the commodities statute as emphasizing extra-judicial resolution of dis-
putes, at least to the extent that Congress specifically authorized repara-
tions proceedings before the CFTC. Although the court in Smoky
Greenhaw Cotton acknowledged Congress' silence as to the permissibility
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the court viewed the CFTC's regu-
lations authorizing such agreements and the commodities statute's repa-
rations provisions as sufficient authority to warrant rejection of the Wilko
doctrine in the commodities setting.
The Third Circuit also rejected the Wilko doctrine's extension to
commodities claims. In Salcer v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith,
Inc. ,121 the Third Circuit enforced a commodities contract arbitration
clause on the ground that the customer had voluntarily elected to have
his claim submitted to arbitration by executing the contract. The court
of appeals in Salcer stated that the arbitration agreement did not violate
any requirements set forth in the CFTC's regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the commodities statute. The court's one-paragraph discussion
did not cite or discuss Wilko or its progeny.
119. Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 683 F.2d 603 (lst Cir. 1982).
120. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d
1446 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. Salcer v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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In summary, before the 1982 arbitration amendments to the com-
modities statute, every court of appeals asked to consider extending
Wilko to commodities claims refused to do so. Recent trial court rulings
not involving the 1982 legislation have also declined to follow Wilko in
the context of commodities fraud disputes. 122 Thus, for a variety of rea-
sons, Wilko arguments met with little success before 1982.
Impact Of The 1982 Arbitration Amendments
To The Commodities Statute
Despite the strongly pro-arbitration tenor of the decisions rendered
before the 1982 legislation, future challenges to commodities contract ar-
bitration clauses may still be successful. The success of such attacks will
depend on the reach of the 1982 commodities legislation's arbitration
mandate. While the 1982 amendments appear to foreclose Wilko argu-
ments in actions arising directly under the commodities statute, recent
cases reflect some plaintiffs' unsettling creativity in framing commodities
frauds as antitrust, securities, and RICO violations, all of which fall
within the Wilko doctrine's anti-arbitration exception. Such claims ap-
pear to be beyond the reach of the commodities statute's 1982 arbitration
provisions, posing new and difficult Wilko hurdles for those who seek to
enforce arbitration clauses.
The logical starting point for determining the scope of the 1982
commodities statute's arbitration mandate is the language of the statute
itself. Arbitration is sanctioned in several sections, but the language in
these sections differs. For private actions against contract markets and
registered futures associations, the commodities statute authorizes settle-
ment of customers' claims and grievances by means of fair and equitable
procedures, including arbitration, so long as the procedures are "volun-
tary" from the standpoint of the aggrieved customer. 123 In contrast, for
private actions against persons other than contract markets, contract
market clearing organizations, board of trade, and registered futures as-
sociations, the statute simply states that it does not limit the rights of
parties to agree in advance of disputes upon any claim-resolution forum,
including arbitration. 124 This particular arbitration provision only gov-
erns claims "under this section,"1 25 meaning private actions against those
122. See, e-g., Corcoran v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ga.
1984); Magstrom v. Breutman, MEB, 572 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Romnes v. Bache & Co.,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
123. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(l1), 21(BX1O) (1984).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(2) (1984).
125. Id.
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persons enumerated in section 25(a). The legislative history for the 1982
arbitration amendment demonstrates Congress' intent to treat contract
markets and registered futures associations differently from other market
participants for purposes of private actions, but the history offers no ex-
planation as to the Congressional intent behind the different language
employed in the various arbitration amendments.1 26
Although Congress' attempt to encourage arbitration as a dispute
resolution forum is laudable, the statute's use of different language in its
arbitration sections may hinder contract markets and registered futures
associations in their efforts to enforce arbitration clauses agreed to in
advance of disputes. To the extent that sections 7(a)(11) and 21 (b)(10) of
the amended commodities statute state that arbitration "shall be volun-
tary" without further stating that arbitration can be voluntarily elected
at the pre-dispute stage, aggrieved customers may argue that pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in form adhesion contracts are involuntary. This
argument finds support in the dissent in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leba-
non) S.A.L.,127 where Judge Swygert suggested it is unreasonable to as-
sume that unsophisticated commodities customers have sufficient
knowledge, background, or foresight to make "voluntary" elections as to
arbitration at the pre-dispute stage of executing their contracts. This was
precisely the point the Supreme Court made in Wilko:
When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act,
waives his right to sue in courts [by virtue of an arbitration agreement],
he gives up more than would a participant in other business transac-
tions. The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue. He
thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him and surren-
ders it at a time when he is less able to judge the weight of the handi-
cap the Securities Act places upon his adversary. 128
In defense of contract markets and registered futures associations,
the argument can be made that arbitration clauses in form commodities
contracts should be considered "voluntary" because of the manner in
which those clauses are presented. The CFTC has promulgated regula-
tions that define the term "voluntary" and expressly approve contractual
arbitration clauses so long as they are accompanied by qualifications
printed in bold type. 129 These qualifications must include an explanation
that civil court litigation, CFTC reparations proceedings, and private ar-
bitration are available to resolve disputes. The bold print qualifications
126. 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3905-06, 3965-67, 3992-94.
127. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
905 (1977).
128. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 180 (1984).
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must also explain that agreement to the arbitration provision is not re-
quired and may result in a waiver of a customer's right to sue in court.1 30
Given such clear and unequivocal contract language, a customer's sepa-
rate, signed endorsement of an arbitration clause should be deemed "vol-
untary" as that term is used in the statute.
A second and greater deficiency in the 1982 arbitration amendments
concerns the limiting language accompanying the private right of action
established in section 25. As previously noted, subsection (a) creates a
private right of action for actual damages sustained by customers as a
result of violations of the commodities statute by certain enumerated per-
sons. Subsection (b) then approves arbitration as a means of resolving
customer claims "under this section." Because the phrase "under this
section" is clear and unambiguous, commodities fraud actions arising
under statutes other than the commodities legislation appear to fall
outside the arbitration mandate found in section 25(b).
In light of the narrow applicability of the arbitration provision in
section 25(b), creative plaintiffs' attorneys faced with contractual arbitra-
tion clauses can be expected to plead their clients' fraud claims as viola-
tions of other federal legislation, notably the antitrust, securities, and
RICO statutes. As previously indicated, actions under each of these stat-
utes have been held to fall within the Wilko doctrine's anti-arbitration
exception. A cursory examination of recent cases demonstrates that
plaintiffs are now using such non-commodities statutes as vehicles for
recovery in commodities fraud cases. The use of these statutes is signifi-
cant because they provide plaintiffs with far stronger remedies against
commodities firms than are ordinarily available in arbitration.
The tremendous impact of the RICO statute on civil litigation is
undeniable. Two or more acts of garden-variety business fraud can and
often do constitute a violation of RICO, and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 3 l rejected the notion that an or-
ganized crime nexus or special racketeering injury must be demonstrated
in RICO actions. The Supreme Court's Sedima decision has assured the
continued use of RICO claims in all areas of business litigation, including
the commodities field. Examples of relatively simple commodities fraud
claims which were artfully transmuted into highly dangerous RICO ac-
tions can be found in Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,132
Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc.,133 Heinhold Commodities, Inc. v.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(6) (1984).
131. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
132. 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
133. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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McCarty,13 4 and Smith v. Groover.135
Although none of the foregoing commodities cases involved the ar-
bitration provision now found in section 25(b) of the commodities stat-
ute, the arbitrability of RICO claims under the general federal
arbitration statute has already been addressed by a number of courts.1 36
Representative of these decisions is SA. Mineracae da Trindade-Samitri
v. Utah International Inc., 37 in which the court considered the conflict-
ing policies underlying the federal arbitration and RICO statutes. Rely-
ing heavily on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in American
Safety Equipment v. J.P. Maguire,13 8 the court in Utah International held
that the important public policy embodies in the anti-racketeering statute
should not be enforced in private arbitration proceedings. The Utah In-
ternational court therefore held that contractual arbitration clauses are
void to the extent that they mandate arbitration of RICO claims. Thus,
commodities firms will find themselves robbed of the benefit of their arbi-
tration clauses if customers frame their court pleadings in terms of RICO
violations rather than private actions under section 25 of the commodi-
ties statute.
A similar though more esoteric problem is presented by antitrust
claims. Although antitrust rules have somewhat limited application in
the commodities context due to the commodities statute's antitrust provi-
sion, 13 9 antitrust claims still can arise and present significant exposures
for commodities firms. For example, in Strobl v. New York Mercantile
Exchange, 140 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that price manip-
134. 518 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
135. 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
136. Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 1985)
(RICO claim may not be subject to arbitration, but issue preclusion from arbitration proper); Jacob-
son v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 510 (w.D. Pa. 1984) (RICO claims
are not subject to arbitration); Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 602 F. Supp.
867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (same); Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 735
(W.D.N.C. 1984) (same); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 567 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (same);
Sports Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, 586 F. Supp. 342, 346-49 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (prior arbitration pre-
cludes subsequent RICO and securities claims); N. Donald and Co. v. American United Energy
Corp., 585 F. Supp. 533, (D.C. Col. 1984) (arbitration of claims permitted and RICO and securities
acts claims abated pending result); Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l. Inc., 576 F. Supp.
566, 574-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (RICO claim not arbitrable, but would be stayed pending arbitration of
other claims), aff'd, 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984). But see, West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
No. C 85-582 M (W.D. Wash., August 15, 1985) (RICO claims are subject to arbitration); Finn v.
Davis, No. 84-8414 Civ. (S.D. Fla., June 19, 1985) (same).
137. 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
138. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
139. 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
140. 768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1985). The second circuit rejected two district court decisions holding
that the commodities statute impliedly repealed the antitrust laws to the extent they conflict (over-
lap). See Smith v. Grower, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. IMI. 1979); Schaefer v. First National Bank of
Lincolnwood, 326 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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ulation in violation of the commodities statute also contravened the anti-
trust laws. A similar holding regarding monopolization can be found in
Strax v. Commodity Exchange, Inc. 141
In those cases where antitrust claims arise out of underlying com-
modities transactions, the Wilko doctrine's anti-arbitration exception
clearly voids contractual arbitration clauses. Numerous decisions have
established this point, at least with respect to domestic transactions. The
only exception in the antitrust area concerns the arbitrability of claims
involving international transactions. 142
Commodities transactions can also give rise to securities fraud
claims. The commodities statute itself specifically recognizes that com-
modity pools are subject to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.143 Although the authorities are in conflict, some
decisions have held that discretionary commodity trading accounts are
subject to the securities laws because they constitute "investment con-
tracts" as that term is defined in the Supreme Court's decision in Securi-
ties Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co. 144 Securities fraud claims,
of course, can never be arbitrated since they were the subject of the
Supreme Court's decision in Wilko.
The impact of the non-arbitrability of antitrust, securities fraud, and
RICO claims can be readily appreciated after comparing the different
remedies available in arbitration proceedings. Treble damages, 145 puni-
tive damages,'" and attorneys' fees 147 can be recovered in federal court
commodities fraud actions simply by pleading those actions as violations
of the antitrust, securities, and RICO statutes and by joining such allega-
tions with pendent claims of common law fraud or breach of fiduciary
duty. 148 In contracts, attorneys' fees generally cannot be obtained as part
141. 524 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
142. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 53 U.S.L.W. 5069 (1985).
143. 7 U.S.C. § 6m (1982).
144. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For a general discussion of whether discretionary commodity trading
accounts constitute investment contracts, see Note, Discretionary Commodity Accounts as Securities
An Application of the Howey Test, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 (1984).
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
146. Punitive damages are available in most jurisdictions for intentional, reckless or willful and
wanton misconduct. See, e.g., Pendowski v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 484, 411 N.E.2d
910 (1980); Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 114 III. App. 3d 703, 450 N.E.2d 1199
(1983).
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982).
148. For a good general discussion of the increasing frequency of RICO allegations in commodi-
ties fraud cases, see Sackheim, Leto, and Friedman, Commodities Litigation.: The Impace of RICO,
34 DEPAUL L. REv. 23 (1984). For an example of a case discussing the applicability of the securi-
ties laws to commodities fraud claims, see Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exchange, No. 84-7328 (2d
Cir.) July 5, 1985.
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of the arbitral award,1 49 and in many instances treble damages °50 and
punitive damages also may be unavailable in arbitration. 51
The impact of court proceedings in lieu of arbitration is even more
readily appreciated in cases of wide-spread commodities fraud. In such
situations, federal class actions can be brought to seek appropriate judi-
cial relief at minimal cost to class members, many of whom otherwise
would never discover or remedy the frauds. Class actions can last for
many years and prove very costly from a defense standpoint, even when
individual class members receive relatively small damage awards at the
conclusion of the litigation.
A Legislative Proposal
To remedy the defects in the 1982 legislation, Congress should
amend the commodities statute to include far broader arbitration provi-
sions. In particular, a separate section addressing arbitration of any and
all claims arising out of underlying commodities transactions should be
included in the commodities statute. The arbitration provision should be
drafted so that its language preempts commodity fraud actions brought
under antitrust, securities, RICO, and other statutes that may apply to
commodities transactions. A similar provision should be included to pre-
clude claims founded on state law that arise out of commodities
transactions.
A broad federal arbitration provision might be drafted as follows:
ARBITRATION
(1) Availability: In all instances in which fraudulent or other-
149. Attorneys' fees generally are not available in arbitration proceedings absent an express
agreement to the contrary. See, e.g., Uniform Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § - (1982); J.P.
Greathouse Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Brothers Construction Co., 374 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1968). Where attorneys' fees are expressly called for under the contract,
they must be awarded. See S.J. Agnew v. Lacy Co-Ply, 33 Wash App. 283, 654 P.2d 712 (1982).
150. An argument can be made that in some instances statutory damages, such as those specified
in the RICO statute, could be awarded under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Kamakazi Music
Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), ard, 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982)
(copyright Act damages awarded).
151. Many jurisdictions view punitive damages as a sanction exclusively reserved to the state and
hence not available in arbitration proceedings, regardless of contractual provisions to the contrary.
See, e.g., United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. App. 1983);
School City v. East Chicago Federation, 422 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. App. 1981); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976); Silverberg v. Schwartz, 75 App. Div.
2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980); Kennewick Education Association v. Kennewick School Dist., 35
Wash. App. 280, 666 P.2d 928 (1983). The issue is unsettled, however, because several recent deci-
sions have approved punitive damages as arbitral awards. See, e.g., Willoughby Roofing & Supply
Co., Inc. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Willis v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 676 (1984); Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., 17 Ohio St. 3d 195, 478
N.E.2d 1000 (1985).
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wise improper conduct, actions, or advise is alleged or claimed to have
occurred in connection with commodities transactions, investments,
contracts, or market activity, arbitration or other private dispute reso-
lution proceedings shall be permitted to resolve such allegations or
claims, even if such allegations or claims arise under statutes, rules,
regulations, or laws other than the federal commodities laws codified
in 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Arbitration or other private dispute resolution
proceedings may be agreed upon by the parties in advance of any dis-
pute or anytime after a dispute has arisen. In the event the parties
desire to agree upon arbitration or other private dispute resolution pro-
ceedings in advance of any dispute, such agreements must be in writing
and must contain an explanation as to the availability of court or repa-
rations proceedings as alternatives to arbitration or other private dis-
pute resolution proceedings.
(2) Regulations: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
is authorized and diredted to promulgate appropriate regulations set-
ting forth the manner in which contracts must explain the availability
of court or reparations proceedings as alternatives to arbitration or
other private dispute resolution proceedings.
(3) Jurisdiction: In all instances in which the parties have
agreed to arbitration or other private dispute resolution proceedings,
any party may invoke the agreement as a basis for compelling arbitra-
tion or other private dispute resolution proceedings in lieu of court or
reparation proceedings. Federal and State courts shall decline jurisdic-
tion of any and all commodities disputes described above in subsection
(1) of this section whenever any party moves to compel arbitration or
other private dispute resolution proceedings pursuant to the parties'
agreement. Federal and State courts shall enforce any award or deci-
sion resulting from arbitration or other private dispute resolution pro-
ceedings. Failure to request arbitration or other private dispute
resolution proceedings before answering a complaint in Federal or
State court shall waive a party's right to compel arbitration or other
private dispute resolution proceedings, but the parties may mutually
agree upon arbitration or other private dispute resolution proceedings
in lieu of court or reparations proceedings at any point in the litigation.
(4) Statutory Construction: In addressing the policies, purposes,
and language of this arbitration provision, courts shall interpret the
terms of this provision as broadly as possible to encourage arbitration
or other private dispute resolution proceedings in lieu of court or repa-
ration proceedings.
By broadening the commodities statute's arbitration mandate along
these lines, Congress can avoid conflicting court decisions as to the appli-
cability of the Wilko doctrine under various federal and state statutes
that may apply in a given commodities case. Such legislation would re-
duce the uncertainty surrounding commodities transactions and litiga-
tion, thereby improving the efficiency of the commodities market and
reducing costs to commodities firms that must comply with federal regu-
lations governing their activities.
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CONCLUSION
Congress' desire to protect the investing public from unscrupulous
commodities firms has a long and involved history. Although the lower
courts seemed to accept the notion that arbitration was permissible for
commodities fraud claims arising prior to the advent of the 1982 com-
modities legislation, the arbitration provisions enacted by that legislation
are rather limited. Commodities contract arbitration clauses thought to
be valid in light of the 1982 legislation are almost certain to be circum-
vented by means of clever pleadings recasting commodities fraud claims
as antitrust, securities fraud, and RICO actions rather than private ac-
tions under section 25 of the commodities statute. To correct this impor-
tant shortcomings in the 1982 legislation, Congress should amend the
commodities statute and broaden its arbitration mandate so that all com-
modity fraud claims are subject to arbitration, regardless of the statute
under which they are claimed to arise.
